Research by Topic
Sections: Reasons, Rationality and Normativity | Well-Being, Meaningfulness and Prudence | Moral Sentiments | Practical Ethics | Moral Psychology | Philosophy of Philosophy | Miscellaneous | Book Reviews| Edited Volume
Reasons, Rationality, and Normativity
(forthcoming) 'Reflective Equilibrium' (with Jaakko Hirvelä). In David Copp, Tina Rulli, and Connie Rosati (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics.
(forthcoming) 'Creativity, Spontaneity, and Merit'. Art & Philosophy. Eds. Alex King and Christy Mag Uidhir. Oxford University Press.
(2023) 'The Epistemic vs. the Practical'. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 18,137–162.
(2021) 'Rationality as the Rule of Reason'. Noûs 55 (3), 538–559.
(2018) 'Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability'. Philosophers' Imprint 18 (8), 1–16.
(2018) ‘Practical Reasoning’. The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Ed. Daniel Star. Oxford University Press, 395–422.
(2015) ‘Favoring’. Philosophical Studies. 172 (7), 1953–1971.
(2014) ‘Fittingness and Idealization’. Ethics 124 (3), 572–588.
Well-Being, Meaningfulness, and Prudence
(forthcoming) 'Better Life Stories Make Better Lives: A Reply to Berg'. Philosophical Studies.
(forthcoming) 'Telic Perfectionism and the Badness of Pain'. In Mauro Rossi and Christine Tappolet (eds.), Perspectives on Ill-Being. Oxford University Press.
(2022) 'Epistemic Welfare Bads and Other Failures of Reason'. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46, 251-279.
(2022) 'The Experience of Meaning'. In Iddo Landau (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Meaning in Life. Oxford University Press, 343-355.
(2021) 'Dying for a Cause: Meaning, Commitment, and Self-Sacrifice'. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 90, 57–80.
(2021) 'Against Seizing the Day'. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 11, 91–111.
(2020) 'Prudence, Sunk Costs, and the Temporally Extended Self'. Journal of Moral Philosophy 17, 658–681.
(2020) 'The World According to Suffering' . In David Bain, Michael Brady, and Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Suffering. Routledge, 19–36.
(2018) 'Agency, Experience, and Future Bias'. Thought 7 (4), 237–245.
(2017) 'Pride, Achievement, and Purpose'. In J. Adam Carter and Emma Gordon (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Pride. Rowman and Littlefield, 169–189.
(2015) ’The Narrative Calculus’. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5, 196–220.
(2015) 'What's So Great About Experience?' Res Philosophica 92 (2), 371–388. Special issue on transformative experience.
(2015) ‘Meaningfulness’. Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being. Ed. Guy Fletcher.
(2014) 'Flourishing and Finitude'. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, October 2014, 1–6.
(2013) ‘Meaning and Happiness’. Philosophical Topics 41 (1), 161–185. (Actually written and published in 2015!)
(2012) ‘Meaningfulness and Time’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2), 345–377.
(2009) ‘Working Hard and Kicking Back: The Case for Diachronic Perfectionism’. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, April 2009, 1–10.
Moral Sentiments
(forthcoming) 'How Emotions Grasp Value'. Philosophical Issues.
(2021) ’Moral Sentimentalism’. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. First published January 2014, major update November 2021.
(2021) 'Relational Imperativism About Affective Valence'. Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind 1, 341–371.
(2019) 'What Is Sentimentalism? What Is Rationalism?' (Commentary on Joshua May's Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind). Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
(2019) 'Ideals and Idols: On the Nature and Appropriateness of Admiration'. In The Moral Psychology of Admiration. Eds. Alfred Archer and André Grahle. Rowman and Littlefield.
(2018) 'Valuing Anger'. In The Moral Psychology of Anger. Eds. Myisha Cherry and Owen Flanagan. Rowman and Littlefield.
(2017) 'Sentimentalism, Blameworthiness, and Wrongdoing'. In Ethical Sentimentalism. Eds. Karsten Stueber and Remy Debes. Cambridge University Press, pp. 133–152.
(2017) 'Empathy as the Moral Sense?'. Philosophia 45 (3), 867–879.
(2017) 'Empathy and Moral Judgment'. In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy. Ed. Heidi Maibom.
(2016) 'Character and Blame in Hume and Beyond'. In Questions of Character. Ed. Iskra Fileva. Oxford University Press.
(2015) ‘Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation’. In Motivational Internalism. Ed. Gunnar Björnsson et al. Oxford University Press.
(2015) 'Hate and Punishment'. Journal of Interpersonal Violence. 30 (10), 1719–1737. Special issue on hate crime, ed. Christian Munthe and David Brax.
(2014) ‘Empathy, Emotion Regulation, and Moral Judgment’. In Empathy and Morality. Ed. Heidi Maibom, Oxford University Press, 97–121.
(2013) ‘A Humean Theory of Moral Intuition’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3), 360–381.
(2013) ‘Sentimentalism’. The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Ed. Hugh LaFollette. Blackwell, Oxford.
(2010) ‘What Makes a Sentiment Moral?’ Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5, 225–256.
Practical Ethics
(forthcoming) 'Suicide as Protest'. Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Suicide. Eds. Michael Cholbi and Paolo Stellino. Oxford University Press.
(forthcoming) 'How (Not) to Make Trade-Offs Between Health and Other Goods'. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.
(2021) 'Who Should Bear the Risk When Self-Driving Vehicles Crash?' Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (4), 630–645.
Moral Psychology
(forthcoming) 'What Roles Do Emotions Play in Morality?'. In Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. Ed. Andrea Scarantino.
(2015) ‘Moral Intuition in Philosophy and Psychology’. In Springer Handbook of Neuroethics. Eds. Jens Clausen and Neil Levy. Springer.
(2013) ‘Ethics and Empirical Psychology’. In Empirically Informed Ethics. Eds. Markus Christen et al. Springer.
(2010) ‘Moral Judgment and Volitional Incapacity’. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy vol. 7: Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. Eds. Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein. MIT Press, 235–258.
(2008) ‘Moral Internalism and the Brain’. Social Theory and Practice 31 (1), 1–24.
Philosophy of Philosophy
(2019) 'Who's Afraid of Trolleys?' In Jussi Suikkanen and Antti Kauppinen (eds.) Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge.
(2007) ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2), 95–118. Reprinted in Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014.
Miscellaneous
(2021) 'Twin Earth'. In Philosophy Illustrated, ed. and illustrated by Helen De Cruz. Oxford University Press.
(2011) 'The Social Dimension of Autonomy'. In The Critical Theory of Axel Honneth. Ed. Danielle Petherbridge, Brill, 2011. (Note: written in 2005!)
(2010) ‘The Pragmatics of Transparent Belief Reports’. Analysis 70 (3), 438–446.
(2002) 'Reason, Recognition, and Internal Critique'. Inquiry 45 (4), 479–498.
Book Reviews
(2021) Review of Cheshire Calhoun's Doing Valuable Time. Philosophical Review 130 (1), 154–158.
(2015) Review of David Velleman's Foundations for Moral Relativism. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
(2015) Review of Thaddeus Metz's Meaning in Life: An Analytical Study. Ethics 125 (2).
(2013) Review of Robert Audi's Moral Perception. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Reasons, Rationality, and Normativity
(forthcoming) 'Reflective Equilibrium' (with Jaakko Hirvelä). In David Copp, Tina Rulli, and Connie Rosati (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics.
(forthcoming) 'Creativity, Spontaneity, and Merit'. Art & Philosophy. Eds. Alex King and Christy Mag Uidhir. Oxford University Press.
(2023) 'The Epistemic vs. the Practical'. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 18,137–162.
(2021) 'Rationality as the Rule of Reason'. Noûs 55 (3), 538–559.
(2018) 'Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability'. Philosophers' Imprint 18 (8), 1–16.
(2018) ‘Practical Reasoning’. The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Ed. Daniel Star. Oxford University Press, 395–422.
(2015) ‘Favoring’. Philosophical Studies. 172 (7), 1953–1971.
(2014) ‘Fittingness and Idealization’. Ethics 124 (3), 572–588.
Well-Being, Meaningfulness, and Prudence
(forthcoming) 'Better Life Stories Make Better Lives: A Reply to Berg'. Philosophical Studies.
(forthcoming) 'Telic Perfectionism and the Badness of Pain'. In Mauro Rossi and Christine Tappolet (eds.), Perspectives on Ill-Being. Oxford University Press.
(2022) 'Epistemic Welfare Bads and Other Failures of Reason'. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46, 251-279.
(2022) 'The Experience of Meaning'. In Iddo Landau (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Meaning in Life. Oxford University Press, 343-355.
(2021) 'Dying for a Cause: Meaning, Commitment, and Self-Sacrifice'. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 90, 57–80.
(2021) 'Against Seizing the Day'. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 11, 91–111.
(2020) 'Prudence, Sunk Costs, and the Temporally Extended Self'. Journal of Moral Philosophy 17, 658–681.
(2020) 'The World According to Suffering' . In David Bain, Michael Brady, and Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Suffering. Routledge, 19–36.
(2018) 'Agency, Experience, and Future Bias'. Thought 7 (4), 237–245.
(2017) 'Pride, Achievement, and Purpose'. In J. Adam Carter and Emma Gordon (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Pride. Rowman and Littlefield, 169–189.
(2015) ’The Narrative Calculus’. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5, 196–220.
(2015) 'What's So Great About Experience?' Res Philosophica 92 (2), 371–388. Special issue on transformative experience.
(2015) ‘Meaningfulness’. Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Well-Being. Ed. Guy Fletcher.
(2014) 'Flourishing and Finitude'. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, October 2014, 1–6.
(2013) ‘Meaning and Happiness’. Philosophical Topics 41 (1), 161–185. (Actually written and published in 2015!)
(2012) ‘Meaningfulness and Time’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2), 345–377.
(2009) ‘Working Hard and Kicking Back: The Case for Diachronic Perfectionism’. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, April 2009, 1–10.
Moral Sentiments
(forthcoming) 'How Emotions Grasp Value'. Philosophical Issues.
(2021) ’Moral Sentimentalism’. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. First published January 2014, major update November 2021.
(2021) 'Relational Imperativism About Affective Valence'. Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind 1, 341–371.
(2019) 'What Is Sentimentalism? What Is Rationalism?' (Commentary on Joshua May's Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind). Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
(2019) 'Ideals and Idols: On the Nature and Appropriateness of Admiration'. In The Moral Psychology of Admiration. Eds. Alfred Archer and André Grahle. Rowman and Littlefield.
(2018) 'Valuing Anger'. In The Moral Psychology of Anger. Eds. Myisha Cherry and Owen Flanagan. Rowman and Littlefield.
(2017) 'Sentimentalism, Blameworthiness, and Wrongdoing'. In Ethical Sentimentalism. Eds. Karsten Stueber and Remy Debes. Cambridge University Press, pp. 133–152.
(2017) 'Empathy as the Moral Sense?'. Philosophia 45 (3), 867–879.
(2017) 'Empathy and Moral Judgment'. In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Empathy. Ed. Heidi Maibom.
(2016) 'Character and Blame in Hume and Beyond'. In Questions of Character. Ed. Iskra Fileva. Oxford University Press.
(2015) ‘Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation’. In Motivational Internalism. Ed. Gunnar Björnsson et al. Oxford University Press.
(2015) 'Hate and Punishment'. Journal of Interpersonal Violence. 30 (10), 1719–1737. Special issue on hate crime, ed. Christian Munthe and David Brax.
(2014) ‘Empathy, Emotion Regulation, and Moral Judgment’. In Empathy and Morality. Ed. Heidi Maibom, Oxford University Press, 97–121.
(2013) ‘A Humean Theory of Moral Intuition’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3), 360–381.
(2013) ‘Sentimentalism’. The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Ed. Hugh LaFollette. Blackwell, Oxford.
(2010) ‘What Makes a Sentiment Moral?’ Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5, 225–256.
Practical Ethics
(forthcoming) 'Suicide as Protest'. Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Suicide. Eds. Michael Cholbi and Paolo Stellino. Oxford University Press.
(forthcoming) 'How (Not) to Make Trade-Offs Between Health and Other Goods'. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.
(2021) 'Who Should Bear the Risk When Self-Driving Vehicles Crash?' Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (4), 630–645.
Moral Psychology
(forthcoming) 'What Roles Do Emotions Play in Morality?'. In Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. Ed. Andrea Scarantino.
(2015) ‘Moral Intuition in Philosophy and Psychology’. In Springer Handbook of Neuroethics. Eds. Jens Clausen and Neil Levy. Springer.
(2013) ‘Ethics and Empirical Psychology’. In Empirically Informed Ethics. Eds. Markus Christen et al. Springer.
(2010) ‘Moral Judgment and Volitional Incapacity’. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy vol. 7: Action, Ethics, and Responsibility. Eds. Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein. MIT Press, 235–258.
(2008) ‘Moral Internalism and the Brain’. Social Theory and Practice 31 (1), 1–24.
Philosophy of Philosophy
(2019) 'Who's Afraid of Trolleys?' In Jussi Suikkanen and Antti Kauppinen (eds.) Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge.
(2007) ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2), 95–118. Reprinted in Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014.
Miscellaneous
(2021) 'Twin Earth'. In Philosophy Illustrated, ed. and illustrated by Helen De Cruz. Oxford University Press.
(2011) 'The Social Dimension of Autonomy'. In The Critical Theory of Axel Honneth. Ed. Danielle Petherbridge, Brill, 2011. (Note: written in 2005!)
(2010) ‘The Pragmatics of Transparent Belief Reports’. Analysis 70 (3), 438–446.
(2002) 'Reason, Recognition, and Internal Critique'. Inquiry 45 (4), 479–498.
Book Reviews
(2021) Review of Cheshire Calhoun's Doing Valuable Time. Philosophical Review 130 (1), 154–158.
(2015) Review of David Velleman's Foundations for Moral Relativism. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
(2015) Review of Thaddeus Metz's Meaning in Life: An Analytical Study. Ethics 125 (2).
(2013) Review of Robert Audi's Moral Perception. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Edited Volume
Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge 2019.
Edited with Jussi Suikkanen, who deserves 99% of the credit
(and did 99.5% of the work).
Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge 2019.
Edited with Jussi Suikkanen, who deserves 99% of the credit
(and did 99.5% of the work).
